# UNIVERSITY OF THESSALY

**DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS**

# 4th Pan-Hellenic Conference
# on Applied Economics
# “ECONOMY & DEMOCRACY”

Organized by the Department of Economics, University of Thessaly

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Konrad Adenauer Stiftung

ΕΤΑΙΡΙΑ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΩΝ ΕΡΕΥΝΩΝ
SOCIETY FOR ECONOMIC RESCEARCH
ΑΣΤΙΚΗ ΜΗ ΚΕΡΔΟΣΚΟΠΙΚΗ ΕΤΑΙΡΕΙΑ
ΕΚΔΟΣΕΙΣ-ΕΡΕΥΝΕΣ-ΔΙΟΡΓΑΝΩΣΗ ΣΥΝΕΔΡΙΩΝ

Volos, 23-24 November 2015

Χορηγοί επικοινωνίας:

Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ

TRT

ΕΚΔΟΤΙΚΟΣ ΟΡΓΑΝΙΣΜΟΣ ΠΑΠΥΡΟΣ
ΙΣΤΟΡΙΑ
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ΕΚΔΟΣΕΙΣ ΕΥΡΑΣΙΑ

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**UNIVERSITY OF THESSALY**

**DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS**

**4th Pan-Hellenic Conference**

**on Applied Economics**

**“ECONOMY & DEMOCRACY”**

# CONFERENCE

# ABSTRACT PROCEEDINGS

Volos 2016

## Program outline

**Monday 23 November**

9:00 - 12:00 Registration

9:00 - 9:15 Welcome

9:15 - 10:15 KEYNOTE LECTURE 1

10:15 - 10:30 Coffee/tea break

10:30 - 12:30 PLENARY SESSION

12:30 - 13:30 Conference Lunch

13:30 - 15:30 PARALLEL SESSIONS

15:30 - 15:45 Coffee/tea break

15:45 - 17:45 PARALLEL SESSIONS

17:45 - 18:45 KEYNOTE LECTURE 2

18:45 - 20:00 Honoris Causa Ceremony

20:00 CONFERENCE DINNER

**Tuesday 24 November**

9:00 - 10:00 Registration

9:15 - 10:15 KEYNOTE LECTURE

10:15 - 10:30 Coffee/tea break

10:30 - 12:30 PARALLEL SESSIONS

12:30 The end

## 3 keynote lectures will be given by:

## JOSIAH OBER, GEOFFREY HODGSON & CLAUDE MENARD

### Josiah OBER

Josiah Ober, is Constantine Mitsotakis Professsor in the School of Humanities and Sciences (Departments of Political Science and Classics) in Stanford University. He works on historical institutionalism and political theory, focusing on the political thought and practice of the ancient Greek world and its contemporary relevance. He is the author of a number of books mostly published by Princeton University Press, including *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens* (1989), *Political Dissent in Democratic Athens* (2008), *Democracy and Knowledge* (2008). He has also published about 75 articles and chapters, including recent articles in *American Political Science Review, Philosophical Studies, Hesperia, Polis,* and *Transactions of the American Philological Association.* His new book on *The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece* will appear in Spring 2015, from Princeton UP. It documents and explains the remarkable Greek efflorescence of ca. 800-300 BCE, the Macedonian conquest of the late fourth century, and the persistence of economic flourishing into the Hellenistic era. Other work in progress includes a general theory of democracy a study of rational cooperation and useful knowledge in Greek political thought.

### Geoffrey HODGSON

Geoffrey Hodgson is Research Professor in Business Studies at the University of Hertfordshire. He is Director of the Group for Research in Organisational Evolution (GROE). He is Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Institutional Economics, published by Cambridge University Press, author of over 15 books, over 130 articles in academic journals, and over 80 articles in academic books. Principal fields of academic interest: institutional economics, evolutionary economics, the methodology of economics, the history of economic thought, the nature of the firm, social theory. He is also Secretary of the World Interdisciplinary Network for Institutional Research (WINIR)

### Claude MENARD

Claude Ménard, Professor of Economics and Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, Université de Paris, Panthéon – Sorbonne. He has been a co-founder of the *International Society for New Institutional Economics,* with Ronald Coase, Douglass North, Oliver Williamson, and others, and he served as president of that association in 2001-2002. He has been co-editor of the *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* from 1998 to 2011 and director of the *Advances in New Institutional Analysis* series (Edward Elgar). He has published many books in English and French. (Translations: Japanese, Chinese, Spanish, Russian), and papers in renowned international journals and reports to international organizations, several published.

## Program

### MONDAY 23 NOVEMBER

*9:00 - 12:00 Registration*
*9:00 - 9:15 Welcome*

- Head of the Department of Economics, University of Thessaly, Prof. Dr. Nicholas KYRIAZIS
- Rector of the University of Thessaly, Prof. Dr. George PETRAKOS

## *9:15 - 10:15 KEYNOTE LECTURE*

*Democracy and Inequality in Classical Greece*
**Josiah OBER,** Professor, Department of Political Science and Classics, Stanford University.

*10:15 - 10:30 Coffee/tea break*

## *10:30 - 12:30 PLENARY SESSION*

**CHAIR: Prof. Dr. Michel ZOUBOULAKIS**

10:30 – 11:00

*The delay in awarding of Justice*
**Filoktimon ARNAOUTOGLOU,** Former Vice President, Council of State (Symvoulio tis Epikratias)

11:00 – 11:30

*The role of the judicial officer in the survival of democracy*
**Anna ZAIRI,** Vice President Supreme and Civil and Criminal Court of Greece (Areios Pagos).

11:30 – 12:00

*Political economy perspectives of the fall of the Greek monarchy*
**George TRIDIMAS**, Professor of Political Economy, University of Ulster, Ulster Business School.

12:00 – 12:30

*Europe, politique et culture pour une défense de l'exception culturelle*
**Pino MARIANO,** Professor of Linguistics, University of Lecce, Poet

*12:30 - 13:30 Lunch Break*

*13:30 – 15:30 PARALLEL SESSIONS*

**SESSION 1: Security, peace and democracy in the globalization era**
**CHAIR: Prof. Dr. Panayotis LIARGOVAS**

*Peace Promoting Globalisation?*
**Christos KOLLIAS,** Professor, Department of Economics University of Thessaly.
**Suzanna-Maria PALEOLOGOU,** Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki.

*Democracy and Ethics vs. Intelligence and Security: from WikiLeaks to Snowden*
**Ioannis L. KONSTANTOPOULOS,** Ass. Professor, Department of International and European Studies, University of Piraeus.

*Energy Wealth as Peace and Democracy Incentive: The Eastern Mediterranean Case*
**Andreas STERGIOU,** Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Thessaly.

*Cyberspace Governance and State Sovereignty: A difficult relationship*
**Andrew N. LIAROPOULOS,** Assistant Professor, Department of International & European Studies, University of Piraeus.

**SESSION 2: Models of democratic representation and economic performance**
**CHAIR: Prof. Dr. George TRIDIMAS**

*The first joint stock companies: The emergence of democratic elements in business*
**Nicholas C. KYRIAZIS,** Professor, Department of Economics, University of Thessaly.
**Emmanouil M. L. ECONOMOU,** MSc., Ph.D, Department of Economics, University of Thessaly.
**Theodore METAXAS,** Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Thessaly.

*Direct democracy today*
**Yorgos N. OIKONOMOU**, PhD of Philosophy, University of Athens

*Participatory and direct democracy in practice; lessons from the international cooperative experience*
**Apostolos GEORGIOU,** Department of Economics, University of Thessaly
**Yeoryios STAMBOULIS,** Lecturer, Department of Economics, University of Thessaly

*Electoral and political reform in the 21st century: designing electronic participative democracy*
**Panagiotis KOTSIOS,** Economist PhD.

*Civic engagement of university students: exploring the determinants*
**Paschalis ARVANITIDIS,** Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Thessaly
**Fotini NASIOKA,** Ph.D Candidate, Department of Economics, University of Thessaly

**SESSION 3: Social Market Economy: The German experience**
**CHAIR: Prof. Dr. George BITROS**

*The Role of Democracy in a Social Market Economy*
**Thomas APOLTE**, Professor, University of Münster, Münster School of Business and Economics Center for Interdisciplinary Economics, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

*Το γερμανικό μοντέλο της "Κοινωνικής Οικονομίας της Αγοράς"*
**Spyridon PARASKEVOPOULOS,** Department of Economics, Leipzig University

*The German Concept of Market Economy: Social Market Economy. Its roots and its contributions to liberal economic orders in Germany, Europe and beyond*
**Rolf HASSE,** Department of Economics, Universität Leipzig

*15:30 – 15:45 Coffee/tea break*

## *15:45 – 17:45 PARALLEL SESSIONS*

**SESSION 4: Greek economic crisis and institutional outcomes**
**CHAIR: Prof. Dr. Ilias KATSOULIS**

*Economic crisis in the European periphery: An assessment of EMU membership and home policy effects based on the Greek experience*
**George C. BITROS,** Emeritus Professor of Economics, Athens University of Economics and Business.
**Bala BATAVIA †,** Professor of Economics, DePaul University, Chicago
**Parameswar NANDAKUMAR‡** Emeritus Professor of Economics, Indian Institute of Management, Kozhikode, India.

*Do Institutions and Governance matter in fighting the crises? A comparative study of Greece, Ireland and Portugal*
**Vasiliki KOUYIA,** Department of Economics University of Peloponnese
**Panagiotis LIARGOVAS,** Professor, Department of Economics University of Peloponnese

*Long-term government bond yields and macroeconomic fundamentals: Evidence for Greece during the crisis-era*
**Dionysios CHIONIS,** Professor, Department of Economics, Democritus University of Thrace.
**Ioannis PRAGIDIS,** Lecturer, Department of Economics, Democritus University of Thrace.
**Panagiotis SCHIZAS,** University of Zurich - Department of Banking and Finance

*Fiscal Council and Evaluating Election Programs: The Case of Greece*
**Christos TRIANTOPOULOS,** Research Fellow, Centre of Planning and Economic Research
**Athanasios CHYMIS,** Research Fellow, Centre of Planning and Economic Research

**SESSION 5: Political decision making and economic efficiency**
**CHAIR: Prof. Dr. Christos KOLLIAS**

*Economic efficiency and democratic institutions in Classical Political Economy*
**Michel S. ZOUBOULAKIS,** Professor, Department of Economics, University of Thessaly

*Democracy compromise. An interpretation of the Greek impasse by questioning the cleavage between citizens' society and individuals' society*
**Dionysios TSIRIGOTIS,** Assistant Professor, Department of International and European Studies, Piraeus University.

*The Effect of Democracy on the Current Account Balance*
**Antonis ADAM**, Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Ioannina.
**Sofia TSARSITALIDOU**, PhD Candidate, Department of Economics, University of Ioannina.

*Dictatorships (actually) redistribute more*
**Pantelis KAMMAS,** Department of Economics, University of Ioannina
**Vassilis SARANTIDES,** Department of Economics, University of Sheffield.

**SESSION 6: Public goods: Greek issues in production, distribution and finance**
**CHAIR: Assistant Prof. Dr. Paschalis ARVANITIDIS**

*Equity and universal health coverage of the Greek health system: problems and prospects in a period of economic crisis.*
**Michael CHLETSOS,** Associate, Professor, Department of Economics, University of Ioannina.

*Fiscal policy under government debt constraints: recent evidence from Greece*
**Stephanos PAPADAMOU,** Associate Professor, Department of Economics, University of Thessaly
**Trifon TZIVINIKOS,** MSc., Ph,D Candidate, Department of Economics, University of Thessaly

*Public evaluation of aesthetic pollution in a democracy. Cooperation between the private and public sectors to improve the urban environment*
**Leonidas FRAGKOS-LIVANIOS,** Division of Natural Sciences and Applications, Hellenic Army Academy.
**Odysseas KOPSIDAS, Stamatis AGGELOPOULOS,** Department of Agricultural Technology, Technological Educational Institute of Thessaloniki.

*Valuation of non-market goods in a democratic regime. Investigating the willingness to participate within a low-opportunity-cost target population in historic monuments preservation*
**Odysseas KOPSIDAS,** Department of Agricultural Technology, Alexander Technological Educational Institute of Thessaloniki
**Leonidas FRAGKOS – LIVANIOS,** Division of Natural Sciences and Applications, Hellenic Army Academy
**Stamatis AGGELOPOULOS,** Department of Agricultural Technology, Alexander Technological Educational Institute of Thessaloniki

## *18:15 – 19:15 KEYNOTE LECTURE 2*

*Democracy and Economic Development*
**Geoffrey M. HODGSON,** Professor, Research Professor in Business Studies, University of Hertfordshire.

## *19:15 – 20:00 Honoris Causa Ceremony*

**Josiah OBER** (Honoris Causa Speech): *Normative and Positive Theory, Ancient and Modern*

## *20:00 CONFERENCE DINNER*

## TUESDAY 24 NOVEMBER

*9:00-10:00 Registration*

## *9:15-10:15 KEYNOTE LECTURE 3*

*Political Transaction Costs Lessons from Economic Theory*
**Claude MENARD** Professor, Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, Université Paris (Panthéon-Sorbonne).

*10:15-10:30 Coffee/tea break*

## *10:30 - 12:30 PARALLEL SESSIONS*

- **SESSION 7: Institutional settings and economic performance**
  **CHAIR: Prof. Dr. Dionysios CHIONIS**

*On the Institutional Roots of Swiss Democracy*
**Nikitas GKANAS,** MSc., Ph.D Candiadate, Department of Economics, University of Thessaly, Volos.
**Nicholas KYRIAZIS,** Professor, Department of Economics, University of Thessaly.

*Democratic Institutions and Economic Performance: An Empirical Exploration*
**Kostas RONTOS,** Professor of Statistics and Demography, University of the Aegean.
**Maria-Eleni SYRMALI,** Post-Doctoral Researcher, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences.
**Ioannis VAVOURAS,** Professor of Economic Policy, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens, Greece and Hellenic Open University

*Quantitative easing, gold standard and democratic regime: The case of the USA*
**Nickos A. KYRIAZIS,** MSc., Ph.D Candidate, Department of Economics University of Thessaly.
**Emmanouil M.L. ECONOMOU,** MSc., Ph.D, Department of Economics University of Thessaly.
**Stephanos PAPADAMOU,** Associate Professor, Department of Economics University of Thessaly.

*Υπάρχουσες ανεξάρτητες αρχές ή ίδρυση ειδικής ανεξάρτητης αρχής για την καταπολέμηση της διαφθοράς;*
**Ivi MAUROMOUSTAKOU,** Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Crete

**SESSION 8: European integration: Problems and prospects**
**CHAIR: Prof. Dr. Michel ZOUBOULAKIS**

*The Achaean federal institutions as a mechanism of promotion of the European Union's integration*
**Emmanouil-M.L. ECONOMOU,** MSc., Ph.D, Department of Economics, University of Thessaly
**Nicholas KYRIAZIS,** Professor, Department of Economics, University of Thessaly
**Theodore METAXAS,** Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Thessaly

*Governance networks surplus - democratic and legitimacy deficit? The long road to a democratic networked European Union*
**Kyriakos MIKELIS,** Lecturer, Department Of International and European Studies, University of Macedonia

*How financial MOUs for the support of South EU countries have affected EU Democratic Institutions.*
**Anastasia LEKKA,** Ph.D, International and European Studies, University of Athens.

*European integration and Greece*
**Vicky DELITHEOU,** Asst. Professor, Department of Economics and Regional Development , Panteion University
**Borana LULAJ,** Undergraduate Student, Department of Economics and Regional Development, Panteion University
**Dimitrios TSALAVOUTAS,** Undergraduate Student, Department of Economics and Regional Development, Panteion University.

**SESSION 9: Greek economic crises, social cohesion and the quality of democracy**
**CHAIR: Prof. Dr. Michalis CHLETSOS**

*The Greek "timid" society (Η Ελληνική άτολμη κοινωνία)*
**Elias KATSOULIS, Professor, Department of Political Sociology, Panteion University**

*Democracy and Greece in turbulent economic times: A myth or a reality?*
**D. KYRIAKOU**, BSc, MSc, MBA, PhD Cand,
**D. NIKOVA**, Associate Professor, Department of Economic Sociology, University of National & World Economy.
**N. BLANAS,** Associate Professor, Department of Business Administration, T.E.I. of Thessaly.
**D. BELIAS,** BSc, MSc, PhD Cand.
**P. KALANTORI**, Political Scientist, BSc, MPA

*Sovereign Defaults and Political Regime Transitions*
**Antonis ADAM,** Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Ioannina
**Kostas KARANATSIS**, Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Ioannina

*Trade unions under economic crisis: Has their influence weakened? The Greek example*
**D. KYRIAKOU,** BSc, MSc, MBA, PhD Cand,
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## DIRECTORY OF ABSTRACTS (in alphabetical order)

**Antonis ADAM,** Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Ioannina
**Kostas KARANATSIS**, Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Ioannina

***Sovereign Defaults and Political Regime Transitions***

In this paper we argue that an episode of sovereign default may have severe political consequences. Specifically we show that sovereign defaults are associated with a transition to a more autocratic regime.
The argument of the present paper is based on 3 case studies and econometric evidence from an unbalanced panel of 84 countries from 1800 to 2004. The case studies considered are the default cases of Spain in 1852, Greece in 1932 and Ecuador in 2000. The choice of these case studies is such as to ensure the validity of our argument on different time periods. Moreover these cases allow us to infer that our argument goes through both for democratic countries (Greece in 1932 and for Ecuador in 2000) as well as for autocratic countries (Spain in 1852). These results are also supported from our panel dataset. Specifically, we show using a panel Logit model that within the first 3 years from a default episode there is a statistically significant decline in the level of democracy. This effect exists even when we control for the economic environment, therefore we argue that it is the default per se that results in declines in democracy rather than the unfavorable economic environment. This main result is robust across specifications and it is a consistent in all time periods considered. Our argument is based on the following theoretical idea: a default is associated with increased political conflict within the country and external political isolation. Both these effects are associated with a lower cost for a coup, as the cost of democracy for a rich elite increases and the probability of sanctions from other democracies decline. Then it may be easier for an elite to use repression, either to prevent the creation (if the regime is initially autocratic) or the consolidation of democracy (if the regime is already a democracy).

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***The Effect of Democracy on the Current Account Balance***

We examine the effect of democracy on the current account balance by constructing a dataset that consists of 125 countries over the period 1980 – 2012. Following Chinn and Ito (2007) we use five year averages to exclude short run variations in the current account balance and estimate a fixed effects panel data model, as in Acemoglu et. al (2009) to account for constant historical factors that may influence the structure of the economy. The dependent variable is the current account balance as percent of GDP and the rest of the explanatory variables are similar to Chinn and Prassad (2003). We use the POLITY IV and the Freedom House indices for democracy. Our main finding is that autocracies run lower current account deficits than democracies. The results are found to be robust across alternative empirical specifications. These results suggest that the political regime type is an important determinant of the current account balance. Our paper is related to the literature that examines the effects of democracy on economic outcomes (e.g. Acemoglu et al 2009) and the literature that examines the factors that affect current account balance (Kumhof et al., 2012). Our empirical argument is justified on theoretical grounds. Firstly autocratic regimes want to be insulated by the political pressures of "foreigners" which may hold net foreign assets in their country (see Kalyvitis and Vlachaki, 2011). Moreover dictatorships tend to attract lower FDI than democracies (Adam and Filippaios, 2007). Finally current account consolidations are more easily achieved in an autocratic environment, as dictators face lower political pressures in imposing austerity measures (Anderson, 1988; Aidt and Jensen, 2009).

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***The Role of Democracy in a Social Market Economy***

There is an ongoing debate among both economists and political scientists on whether, if any, democracy promotes growth or growth promotes democracy. However, theoretical empirical results remain rather ambiguous. On the one hand, practically the entire developed world consists of the historical forerunners of our modern free and democratic societies. More recently, however, we have witnessed spectacular and long-lasting growth rates in strict dictatorships like China. Both groups of countries have achieved their high growth on the basis of market forces. But while the former developed their modern market institutions hand in hand with their institutions of political and individual freedom, the latter consistently deny any form of democratic institutions. The tradition of the German Ordoliberalism, which is the intellectual foundation of the concept of the Social Market Economy (SME), has always claimed an interdependency of political and economic institutions. It has, however, never been specific on the particular forces behind that interdependency. From a theoretical point of view, it can now be viewed as established that a centrally planned economy is systematically incompatible with democracy. Such a clear statement can, however, neither theoretically nor empirically be derived for the relation between a market economy and different political systems. When it comes to a SME, things become even more diffuse, although the normative idea behind SME deliberately interrelates political and economic freedom as well as societal responsibility with each other. We first analyze the theoretical relations between political and economic freedom in general and those between a Social Market Economy and democracy in particular. We then look at a number of empirical relations between political and economic institutions on the basis of some modern indicators.

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***The delay in awarding of Justice* (Η καθυστέρηση στην απονομή δικαιοσύνης)**

Μιας και το συνέδριο έχει ως θέμα «Δημοκρατία και Οικονομία» και είναι γνωστό ότι η Δικαιοσύνη αποτελεί έναν από τους πυλώνες της Δημοκρατίας, καθώς και ότι «time is money», είναι αυτονόητο ότι κάθε καθυστέρηση στην απονομή της έχει οικονομικές συνέπειες. Που, όμως, αυτή οφείλεται; Οι πρωταγωνιστές μιας δίκης είναι ο νόμος, ο δικαστής και οι διάδικοι. Πως επηρεάζουν ο καθένας;

Α) Είναι γεγονός ότι ο δικαστής δεν δικάζει κατά την κρίση του. Δικάζει εφαρμόζοντας τον νόμο. Τι το απλούστερο, θα σκεφθείτε;

Αλλά το τοπίο συννεφιάζει αν σκεφθεί κανείς την ποιότητα της νομοθέτησης με τις αλληλοσυγκρουόμενες διατάξεις, καθώς και το ότι ουσιαστικούς νόμους δεν παράγει μόνον η Βουλή, αλλά και, κατ’ εξουσιοδότησή της, η Διοίκηση, με αποτέλεσμα μια πολυνομία άνευ προηγουμένου. Το jura novit curia, τώρα πια, μεγάλο ανέκδοτο. Το τοπίο σκοτεινιάζει ακόμη περισσότερο αν προστεθεί το γεγονός ότι όπου, όπως στην Ελλάδα, υπάρχει υπερκείμενος νόμος, το Σύνταγμα, και ο δικαστικός έλεγχος της συνταγματικότητας των νόμων γίνεται όχι εκ των προτέρων, προ της ψήφισης του νόμου, αλλά εκ των υστέρων. Γιατί ; Γιατί ο νόμος έχει ήδη εφαρμοσθεί και έχει δημιουργήσει καταστάσεις που, αν κριθεί αντισυνταγματικός, ανατρέπονται. Όλα αυτά αφορούσαν το εθνικό δίκαιο. Αλλά, τώρα πια, ο νόμος δεν είναι μόνον εθνικός, είναι ευρωπαϊκός (Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, ΕΣΔΑ). Και μάλιστα, με δικά του δικαστήρια, Λουξεμβούργου και Στρασβούργου. Με αποτέλεσμα, όταν ανακύπτουν διαφορές, πλείστα όσα προβλήματα. Συμπέρασμα; ο εφαρμοστέος νόμος να μπορεί να είναι εξαιρετικά πολύπλοκος.

Β) Έρχομαι στον δικαστή. Λέμε, «ο νομοθέτης» στον ενικό, εν όψει της μονολιθικότητας με την οποία ψηφίζουν συνήθως οι βουλευτές. Όταν λέμε, όμως, «ο δικαστής» στον ενικό, δεν ακριβολογούμε. Γιατί οι δικαστές είναι πολλοί. Όλοι τους παίζουν σημαντικό ρόλο, αλλά ιδιαίτερα οι δικαστές του ανωτάτου δικαστηρίου. Γιατί ; Μα γιατί αυτό χαράσσει την νομολογία, αυτός ακριβώς είναι ο λόγος της ύπαρξής του.

Αυτοί, λοιπόν, οι ανώτατοι δικαστές, που δεν είναι λίγοι, στο ΣτΕ καμιά 65αριά, έχουν ο καθένας τους τα δικά του βιώματα, την δική του προσωπικότητα, την δική του προσέγγιση. Όλοι αυτοί έχουν την δική του ο καθένας αντίδραση. Η νομολογία, λοιπόν, έχει πολλούς πατέρες, αποτελεί δε προϊόν πολλών ζυμώσεων και συγκερασμών.

Γ) Κλείνω με τους διαδίκους. Αυτοί, στην Ελλάδα τουλάχιστον, χαρακτηρίζονται από δικομανία. Και αν για τους πολίτες που έχουν να αντιμετωπίσουν τέτοια κακοδιοίκηση, δεν είναι περίεργο, για το ίδιο το Κράτος είναι. Γιατί, σε εμάς, ο χειρότερος «πελάτης» των δικαστηρίων, τουλάχιστον του ΣτΕ, είναι το Κράτος αν όχι ο αποκλειστικός, ο κύριος υπαίτιος της καθυστέρησης στην απονομή της δικαιοσύνης.

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***Civic engagement of university students: exploring the determinants***

A fundamental element of a truly democratic state is the degree of civic engagement its society exhibits. This refers to the ways in which citizens participate in the life of a community in order to improve conditions of living or to help shape the community's future. Civic engagement can take numerous forms, encompassing a range of behaviors and actions. It is usually measured with indicators in three dimensions: (a) civic, which refers to community focused activities such as volunteering work, fund-raising and active membership in associations; (b) electoral, which refers to involvement in the electoral process through actions such as voting, campaigning and displaying buttons, signs and stickers; and (c) political, which refers to political voice, encompassing actions such as protesting, joining petitions, boycotting and buycotting. The idea of civic engagement has been extensively discussed in the context of younger people. The expectation is for these people to participate in individual and collective actions designed to identify and address issues of public concern as part of their growing-up process of becoming valuable members of a larger social fabric. As such, a young person's record of civic participation is now increasingly examined, along with grades and test scores, by universities and organizations in assessing applicants for admission.

The current paper explores what determines young people civic engagement, using the University of Thessaly as a case study. Analyzing about 2.400 questionnaires from students of the 13 University Departments located in Volos city, the study identifies the level of civic engagement of students, as measured: in active membership in an association, in regular volunteering for non-governmental organizations, in displaying buttons, signs or stickers, in protesting, in signing petitions and in boycotting. Moreover, the paper examines (using OLS regression models) what determines such a behavior. The variables examined include: political ideology, social trust, religiosity, altruism, sociality and life-satisfaction, after controlling for other related factors such as gender, income, nationality, family size and academic discipline.

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***Economic crisis in the European periphery: An assessment of EMU membership and home policy effects based on the Greek experience***

Our objective in this paper is threefold. First, to identify the major common shocks that hit these countries upon entry into the EMU. Second, taking Greece as our case study, to construct a simple macroeconomic model of the policies Greek governments pursued in the presence of these shocks, and to employ its solution so as to highlight the outcomes that were expected to result, and did so. We find that the policies which were put in place led unavoidably to a severe economic crisis and eventual bankruptcy. Finally, in view of these findings and what happened in 2009,we raise and attempt to answer questions such as: How can we explain the policies that were adopted in the advent of monetary union shocks? Could they have been anticipated? And if so, why did they escape the attention of the designers of the Maastricht Treaty? We are led by the analysis to conclude that the shocks in all these countries were perceived by their governments as opportunities to hold on to their entrenched positions. This, in turn, may be perceived as a failure in the mechanisms of economic convergence that were embedded in the Maastricht Treaty as well as in the effectiveness of European Union (EU) institutions that were empowered with their enforcement.

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***Long-term government bond yields and macroeconomic fundamentals: Evidence for Greece during the crisis-era***

This paper studies the influence of macroeconomic fundamentals and the underlying 10 years Greek government bonds. We examine for the period between Q12001 up to end to Q42012, applying four major macroeconomic variables such as Debt to GDP ratio, deficit, inflation and unemployment. We found that, overall, deficit, inflation and unemployment among others, play a more significant role as determinants of the 10-year Greek bond yield, while isolating the period during the crisis macroeconomic factors strengthen their affect to the Greek Debt market.

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***Equity and universal health coverage of the Greek health system: problems and prospects in a period of economic crisis.***

The health system in Greece faced structural problems. The result of these structural problems was the incapacity of the system to collect revenues and supply services of high quality. People were not satisfied from health services provided by institutions in the primary and secondary health sector. They considered that corruption in health sector was high and they obliged to spend their own money for services that have already paid through social security contributions. Hospitals did not perform well and create deficits all the time. The economic crisis affected seriously the health system and it is expected to affect it more in the next years. According to many international studies economic crisis and economic austerity have a negative impact on the health of citizens in long term. Due to economic crisis the decrease of GDP obliges the government to spend less money in the health sector. Health expenditures do not increase due to fiscal obligations of the Greek government. More and more people can't have access to health services due to the fact that they are uninsured or they are unemployed and poor.

Health expenditure as percentage of GDP decreased during the last years. It dropped from 10.2% in 2009 to 9.1% in 2011. Per capita health expenditures decreased from 2,998 (US dollars) in 2008 to 2,361 in 2011. Public expenditure as percentage of total health expenditure decreased from 68.4% in 2009 to 65.1% in 2011. Health expenditure in Greece are financed through taxes, social security contributions, private out-of pocket money, private insurance and other sources. According to OECD data in 2011, 24% of financing health is taxes, 42% if social security contributions, 31% is private out-of pocket money and 3% is private insurance while in OECD (34 countries) 35% is taxes, 37% is social security contributions, 20% is private out-of pocket money and 6% is private insurance. Due to economic crisis there are a growing number of uninsured persons who haven't access to health system. At the same time health system loses revenues due to unemployment, to recession and to fiscal evasion. Data show that most of taxes are paid by the salaried persons. This causes an imbalance of the tax burden between different social groups. Another key issue is the equal access of Greek citizens to health services provided by the public system. In a period of economic crisis there is an increase of demand for public health services while the unequal access to health services is growing. How can we promote equal access to health services while the health system becomes more and more unsustainable ? Equality is one of the characteristics of a democracy. Fairness and equity which are crucial values in a democracy, have an important role in the context of the universal health coverage. Fairness and equity are concerned with the distribution of benefits and burdens in a society.

During the last five years a serious economic and fiscal crisis have affected the Greek health system and the Greek economy. More and more unemployed, poor and uninsured people are faced with problems of having access to health system. The aim of this presentation is to discuss the problems of equal access and universal health coverage of the Greek health system. More specifically the presentation focuses on two issues related to the democracy: equal access of citizens to the Greek health system and universal health coverage of them. Did economic crisis affect the access of the citizens of the Greek society to the health system ? We will show what is universal health coverage and present health inequalities existed among people in Greece. We are investigated which social groups have more affected by economic crisis and to show that it is necessary to finance through taxes services provided to most vulnerable groups (long –term unemployed, uninsured persons) in order to increase their access to the health system.

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***European integration and Greece***

The history of the European Union begins after the Second World War, whose creation began with the aim of ensuring lasting peace. Six countries signed the economic and political treaty to run their heavy industries -carbon and steel- so as not to allow them to manufacture weapons to fight their neighbors. In the coming years,
with the implementation of specific policies and by the end of difficult situations, there was a growth in Europe with the European Union to increase. In 1981, Greece becomes the 10th member of the Union and because of its accession to it should proceed with a process for the transformation of the political and economic system. The path to the EU, until now, is largely influenced by the political situation in the country periodically.
Political and economic factors and integrating the rich cultural heritage in modern Europe, did the relationship between Greek and European identity full of tensions and contradictions.
The possibilities given by the economic, political and moral force of European Integration in Greece concerning the economics of the free movement of people and goods, the common agricultural and foreign policies and the indirect economic effects worldwide, from trade and financial systems to environmental development and energy production. The Union shall complement to Greece and the other Member States. However, the management and utilization of this force differs from state to state, so that the progress of Europeanisation process and convergence vary

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***Public evaluation of aesthetic pollution in a democracy. Cooperation between the private and public sectors to improve the urban environment***

Legislative restrictions such as prohibition of outdoor advertising in a city environment are common to protect non marketable public goods such as the aesthetics of urban environment. Public evaluation of such goods is affair and democratic approach. However, these restrictions hinder the activities of certain industries such as advertising. The purpose of this study is to present a modified model of internalizing external costs caused by the operation of a manufacturing unit in conjunction with a new reality created. The environment is characterized as a public good.

The case examined is the city of Athens. Contingent Valuation Method and expert opinions were used to evaluate the effect of aesthetic pollution and estimate the potential of our proposal. The proposal describes an exemplary collaboration between private and public sector that brings multiple benefits without burdening any social group, on the basis of a Pigouvian subsidy scheme for renovation of city building facades, including motive to encourage advertising on the scaffoldings used for the renovation (which is allowed by law). Advertisers will place advertising screens on the scaffold while revenues from advertising will fund the renovation of the facade of the building. The suggested solution combines two seemingly competing activities of the city, outdoor advertising and the aesthetic reconstruction of building facades. Activity is transferred from micro to macroeconomic level, while at the same time Pareto criterion of optimality is met.

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***The Achaean federal institutions as a mechanism of promotion of the European Union's integration***

In the present paper, we analyze the emergence of one of the first democratic federations in history, the Achaean. We analyze its structure, the decision-making bodies, its institutions and finances. Then, we offer arguments about why the federal structure as a political entity prevailed in Greece, and then compare the Greek proto-federation with the modern European Union as a case study in order to see if the Achaean Federation can offer any institutional settlements useful for the further integration of the European Union (EU) as a federal pan-European entity.

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***Participatory and direct democracy in practice; lessons from the international cooperative experience***

Democracy as a term can be faceted in various modes and in various decision-making processes. The purpose of this paper is to explore examples of the cooperative experience and identify the usage of participatory and direct democracy in the field of the cooperative enterprise. Also we explain how these modes of democracy affect the performance of the cooperative organization.

First, we analyze the terms of participatory and direct democracy. The features of the aforementioned terms need a precise analysis in order to explicate their operation and their potential results. Second, we delve deeper in the processes that take place at the organizational level of the cooperative enterprise; we attempt to explore the issues arising from the features of direct and participatory democracy in the organizational processes.

Third, draw from the international cooperative experience in order to demonstrate the relation between democratic processes and performance. We adduce examples of successful cooperative enterprise which applied participatory democracy in their structures. We examine governance structures according to democratic rules of collective action and decision-making processes. From this perspective, we specify the limits of the direct democracy and figure out the structural relevance between business performance and democratic processes.

Finally, we explore the complementary mechanisms that, by supporting innovation and institutional reproduction, serve as pillars of sustainability of democracy and of the cooperative enterprise as a viable and competitive alternative of business organization.

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***On the Institutional Roots of Swiss Democracy***

Looking back at the history of Switzerland, we can identify some structural changes in the economic, social and cultural environment, also in the spiritual perceptions and attitudes of citizens. These may constituted the basis for the creation of specific standards and played a crucial role in the political and economic course of the country. In this study we examine how institutions can explain the emergence and establishment of democracy in Switzerland. We investigate various aspects of human activity in Switzerland trend since the beginning of its emergence, in order to use the tool of macroculture that includes shared values, norms and beliefs that characterize the members of a society. Important aspects in the country's history are opening trade passages, military tactics, religion and regular cooperation at local level in both the productive and the social aspect. The standards and values spun from the above aspects were transferred gradually to the political field. Finally, it is highlighted that these values contributed decisively in forging a strong polity with robust elements of direct democracy.

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***The German Concept of Market Economy: Social Market Economy. Its roots and its contributions to liberal economic orders in Germany, Europe and beyond***

Thesis 1

Institutional Economics have been providing in theory and empirically that institutional arrangements for a society and an economy are of salient importance for its performance: for prosperity, flexibility and stable expectations.

This is probably an adequate approach to explain the positive results of the German concept of a market economy: The Social Market Economy (SME).

Thesis 2

What is often not adequately considered is the fact that Germany had no real heritage of a liberal economic order when it established the SME, starting in June 1948 with a currency reform and the abolishment of nearly all administered prices and the rationing of goods.

Germany had during the 1920s an interventionistic and cartellized economic order and went in the 1930s to a socialistic, state dominated and planned economic order.

Insofar the change to a market economy was a complete reversal which caused a lot of societal and political conflicts, civil doubts and some unrest. The successes finally convinced first the citizens, then the ruling political parties and later their political opponents and the trade unions, too. The private companies especially the former cartellized branches belonged to the opponents and hesitators but they, too, changed their attitudes and became advocates of the market economy.

Thesis 3

The two pillars for the establishment of the market economy in Germany were

– the American interest for a market economy in Germany and its rejection of the British and French types of economic orders

– the German groups of scientists (economists, lawyers) and civil servants designing (starting already in 1934)) a societal and economic order completely contrary to the orders being implemented by the Nazi-regime.Thus the bases for alternative political, societal and economic orders in Germany were elaborated mainly before the end of WW II.

The concept of SME summarized and enlarged these ideas and was first published and named Social Market Economy by Prof. Dr. A. Müller-Armack in 1946 in his booklet „Wirtschaftslenkung und Marktwirtschaft“.

The implementation of SME followed the German drafts.

Thesis 4

SMS was not designed as an ideal model. It was from the very beginning a design for practical work and implementation. It is based on two main aspects

– first, it is a combination of a societal order and an economic order emphasizing its broad complementarity.

– Second, the main part for the economic order is a set of principles which have to be implemented. These principles are of constitutional importance but not rigid. Their implementation offers some range of options to fit them to different cultural backgrounds – their aims and their results are the focal aspects.

In so far flexibility is part of this concept because cultural backgrounds are different and they change even in one country in time. But some principles have to be kept all the time: free prices in the market place, open markets, ensured competition and price stability or avoiding inflation. The optimal way to ensure competition and price stability seem to be independent institutions which take care of these targets.

Thesis 5

The way how two of the principles were implemented can be regarded as benchmarks for the liberal stance of the market economy in Germany. Their institutional arrangements were designed as real shelter against attempts to erode SME.

These two are: Price stability and its monetary order with the independent Deutsche Bundesbank getting as its core task the realization of price stability. And competition with the competition law and the Bundeskartellamt as the institution in charge which is independent, too.

Principles and the optimal institutional order to realize and protect them are the keys for a stable and positive result of an order.

Thesis 6

Many of the principles of SME were accepted in the EEC and its successors. Neither the concept of SME nor the French „planification“ nor the state-dominated order of Italy nor the global demand approaches of the Benelux-states were transfered to the European integration..The Common Market was designed as an open-access-market internally and externally with competition and European competition policy – a liberal concept.

The principles for the European market were fully in accordance with the principles of SME concerning the part of the economic order. This open-access concept and the way to implement it gives the explanation for the unbelievable success of the EEC and the EC.

The results of the opposite institutional arrangement for the agricultural sector is the very proof for the advantage of a market economy.

Thesis 7

SME is a concept favouring open markets and supporting the opening of markets throughout Europe and beyond. This aim was accepted by the EEC/EC and consequently the competencies for trade policy were transfered to the European Commission to avoid too much national interference and protection.

Another item of benchmarking the international area of liberal orders is the widely accepted independence of the Central Bank for the European Monetary Union and outside the EU, too.

Thesis 8

Like all liberal concepts they suffer from pressure exerted by politicians and special interest groups. This is the fact in Germany as well. Nonetheless these periods did not last too long, then decisions were taken to regain competitiveness, societal and economic prosperity. Some of the reasons why Germany owns such a feed-back or turn-back system will be outlined in the final paper and can then be discussed.

What seems surprising is that these decisions have in the long run a tendency to narrow the existing gap between the executed economic order and the design of SME.

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***Democracy and Economic Development***

Does democracy help economic development? After decades of empirical research the balance of evidence has recently moved towards an affirmative answer, at least for countries above the lowest levels of GDP per capita. Yet this conclusion is resisted by some scholars, using early Western capitalism and modern China as examples of rapid development with little democracy. It is also argued that advocacy of democracy would impose Western norms on countries with different cultures. In this paper I shall suggest that these counter-arguments are mistaken, and for both political and economic reasons, democracy should remain on the developmental agenda

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***Dictatorships (actually) redistribute more***

This paper seeks to examine the effect of political regimes on actual fiscal redistribution. We first use a simplified theoretical framework which allows us to formalize the testable implications of the relevant literature. Subsequently, employing data on Gini coefficients before and after taxes and transfers we develop a measure of fiscal redistribution which allows us to capture the targeting of government transfers. Then, our empirical analysis examines the impact of the political regime on realized fiscal redistribution for a panel of 133 developed and developing countries between 1960 and 2010. Our results suggest that dictatorial regimes redistribute more than democracies through fiscal policies. Moreover, our analysis suggests that the positive impact of the dictatorial regime on fiscal redistribution is mitigating after some years of regime's stability and finally becomes negative. Our empirical findings remain robust across several different specifications and estimation techniques

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***The Greek "timid" society (Η Ελληνική άτολμη κοινωνία)***

Σε ένα μέρος της ακαδημαϊκής βιβλιογραφίας γίνεται διάκριση μεταξύ risk averse και risk friendly κοινωνιών. Παρά τα μέχρι τώρα γνωστά, «άτολμες» θεωρούνται οι νεωτερικές κοινωνίες, ενώ «τολμηρές» εμφανίζονται οι αναπτυσσόμενες χώρες. Οι πρώτες, οι άτολμες, είναι οι σύγχρονες νεωτερικές και εξατομικευμένες κοινωνίες, οι οποίες, στο οικονομικό κυρίως πεδίο εκδηλώνουν άτολμες στάσεις, γιατί μια ενδεχόμενη αποτυχία εκθέτει τους «τολμηρούς» σε κινδύνους τους οποίους οι ίδιοι, σε ατομικό επίπεδο, δύσκολα μπορούν να αντιμετωπίσουν. Αντίθετα, πιο τολμηροί εμφανίζονται οι δρώντες στις αναδυόμενες κοινωνίες, διότι όχι μόνο οι πιθανότητες επιτυχίας μιας «τολμηρής» επιλογής εμφανίζονται αυξημένες, αλλά και διότι σε περιπτώσεις αποτυχίας είναι η οικογένεια, το φιλικό περιβάλλον, η κοινότητα που θα «περιθάλψουν» αυτόν που ριψοκινδύνευσε και απέτυχε.

Παρά το γεγονός ότι η Ελλάδα δεν ανήκει καθ’ολοκληρίαν ούτε στον πρώτο τύπο κοινωνιών: νεωτερικών και εξατομικευμένων, ούτε στον δεύτερο τύπο: προ-νεωτερικών και κολλεκτιβιστικών, εντούτοις παρουσιάζει έντονα τα στοιχεία μιας risk averse, δηλαδή μιας άτολμης κοινωνίας.

Για να αναδείξω τις αιτίες αυτής της ατολμίας θα στηριχθώ στη γνώση που έχει σωρευτεί στο πλαίσιο ερευνών με επίκεντρο τη θεωρία της εξαρτημένης τροχιάς (path dependency) και του συγγενούς φαινομένου του εγκλωβισμού (locked-in) στην τροχιά αυτή. Με τον τρόπο αυτό θέλω να προβάλω την ακινησία στις δομές και τους θεσμούς της ελληνικής κοινωνίας, την οποία η σύγχρονη έρευνα κυρίως ενοχοποιεί για τα σημερινά αδιέξοδα. Σκοπός της μελέτης μου αυτής είναι να συμβάλω στην απελευθέρωση της θεωρίας από την εμμονή της στη διαπίστωση της «πελατειακής» συγκρότησης του νεοελληνικού κράτους και να την κατευθύνω στην πιο εύλογη υπόθεση της αδυναμίας αυτού του κράτους να παραγάγει ένα πλεόνασμα, για τη δίκαιη διανομή του οποίου οι νεωτερικές κοινωνίες δημιούργησαν τις κατάλληλες θεσμικές και άλλες προϋποθέσεις.

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***Peace Promoting Globalisation?***

Globalisation is broadly regarded as a process that creates complex, interlinked ties and relations between economies, societies and countries. Its multidimensional character, mediated through a variety of intensifying flows that are not limited to goods and capital but include information, ideas as well as people, is probably one of the few rare instances where a universal consensus exists among scholars and researchers from a cohort of different perspectives and disciplines. According to Keohane and Nye (2000) globalisation encompasses three major dimensions. The economic, which refers to the flow of goods, capital and services accompanied with the concomitant institutional and other structures induced by market exchanges. The social, that includes the spread of ideas and information as well as cultural and consumer habits. The political, involving the diffusion, harmonization, emulation and even imposition of government policies across countries. The KOF index of globalisation is a composite index that allows for this multidimensionality of this process through three sub-indices: economic, social and political globalisation (Dreher, 2006b; Dreher et al., 2008a).

The economic, political and social outcomes of this dynamic process have come under growing empirical scrutiny given that it is widely viewed as nurturing the cross-fertilization between countries and societies in many and varied spheres, including economic policies and organization, governance and institutions, societal structures, cultural and consumer habits. A particular strand of the expanding globalisation literature, addresses the possible effect this deepening process has on national democratic governance (*inter alia*: Eichengreen and Leblang, 2008; Li and Reuveny, 2003; Ardalan, 2011; Rudra, 2005). Using the globalisation-democracy link as a point of departure, this paper focuses on the possible nexus between globalisation and peace. To this effect, it utilizes the composite Global Peace Index (henceforth GPI) developed by the Institute for Economics and Peace. The GPI is composed of a number of indicators, ranging from a nation’s level of military expenditure to its relations with neighbouring countries, the level of respect for human rights, number of jailed population and homicides, deaths in external and internal conflict and others. In short, the GPI allows for both the external and internal (domestic) dimension of peace which is an inherently difficult concept to define and quantify. The main hypothesis examined here is whether a relationship between globalisation and peace exists and can be traced empirically using these two composite indices as well as the direction of this nexus. To this effect we use data for 132 countries disaggregated in terms of development level for the period 2008-12. Preliminary findings do not allow for robust inferences to be drawn.

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***Electoral and political reform in the 21st century: designing electronic participative democracy***

Politics today in most countries are applied through representatives who are "democratically" elected every few years. Representation has grown to be the dominant political system in the world. This means that political power and decision making is transferred from citizens to their representatives, which gain the right to decide and legislate for them. Even though this trend has created very positive effects in our lives, it has also created some very negative. This vast transfer of power in the hands of few has created various distortions in political, economic and social affairs through corruption, regulatory capture and wrong decision making. Can this system of representation can ever change, or as the world population increases we will always be bound to be represented by others? This research tries to answer these questions, while making a proposal on how a new participative electoral system could work through the Internet.

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***Do Institutions and Governance matter in fighting the crises? A comparative study of Greece, Ireland and Portugal***

Even if the EU countries interact within a common framework, their dissimilarity may result to different outcomes of the various economic policies. Greece, Ireland and Portugal entered the Eurozone before 15 years and although their economies followed different paths, were much affected by the international crisis that began on 2008. The rise of the governmental debt and the decrease of their credit rating lead to the bailout request by the troika (the IMF, the European Commission and the ECB). We compare macroeconomic figures, institutions and good governance during the last 12 years, before the outbreak and during the crisis for those three countries. Additionally, we use econometric model to search the role of specific WGI (World Governance Indicators) corruption, regulatory quality and government effectiveness, in institutional quality, while we refer to their role for competitiveness. Finally, we look at indicators from the IPD on the banking sector and general information on the political context. We show that countries with low performance on governmental and institutional indicators have longer recovery from unforeseen and unfavorable circumstances.

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***Democracy and Ethics vs. Intelligence and Security: from WikiLeaks to Snowden***

The purpose of this paper is to examine thoroughly the relationship between democracy and ethics on the one hand, and intelligence and security, on the other hand, based on two case studies: the WikiLeaks and the Snowden files. The questions which we will try to answer are the following: firstly, "Is intelligence, which consists a prerequisite for achieving security, compatible with democracy and ethics? Secondly, "If there is a gap between them, by which measures can be bridged?" and thirdly "Which conclusions can we reach, as far as IR Theory is concerned, by studying the relationship between democracy/ethics and intelligence/security?

This paper firstly, will analyze the relationship between democracy and ethics on the one hand, and intelligence and security, on the other hand, secondly, will examine the incentives that led both Julian Assange and Edward Snowden to reveal state secrets, and, thirdly, will assess the repercussions of their revelations and the mechanisms that might be created in order to achieve an harmonious relation between democracy/ethics and intelligence/security. And last but not least, this paper will try to clarify the reverberations for IR theory that stem from the relation between democracy/ethics and intelligence/security.

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***Valuation of non-market goods in a democratic regime. Investigating the willingness to participate within a low-opportunity-cost target population in historic monuments preservation***

The preservation of cultural heritage is entailing excessive cost (paid by people through taxation) while is a source of additional income for both, the State and the people, due to tourism. The evaluation of this type of goods cannot be made in market terms. We apply a modified version of the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM), in order to investigate the people's estimation for this good and the willingness to participate at supporting activities concerning the preservation of such antiquities. Further, people willingly participating in the restoration of their environment, thus increasing the value of a public good –such as a site of cultural significance- is a characteristic of democracy.

In this survey, 200 soldiers took part in order to determine whether they wished to participate voluntarily in maintenance and beautification of an archeological site during their military service. They were divided in two groups. The first group was informed about the specific site and its historic value and then answered the questioner, while the second group received a questionnaire without prior information. The second group was subsequently divided into two subgroups, one left without information whatsoever and one that received an information session after the completion of the questioner and then retook the questioner. Willingness to participate (WTP) between the two groups was compared. Firstly, descriptive statistics were applied to determine the profile of the sample. An analysis of variance by means of ANOVA was performed to express WTP as a function of various factors such as age and educational level. Paired Samples T - test of WTP before and after information was performed. The data indicates that those who have been previously or subsequently informed on the archaeological site and its significance were more willing to participate than those who have not.

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***Democracy and Greece in turbulent economic times: A myth or a reality?***

Democracies are characterized by greater freedom, executive accountability and turnover, openness, transparency, and the ability to credibly commit. Each of these characteristics brings important benefits, which are well-recognized. However, as suggested by Remmer (1990), they may also increase the likelihood of financial instability and crisis onset. The philosophical attachment to private liberty and freedom may contribute to excessive financial deregulation and liberalization. Frequent executive turnover may lead democratic leaders to neglect the long-term costs of policies that encourage short-term economic booms. But was Greek democracy largely able to weather the storms of the global recession? Greece’s acute fiscal challenges have resulted in widespread public anger and distrust of the government. Therefore, which is the most important factor explaining democratic resilience in turbulent economic times in Greece? This study will try to prove that despite their imperfections, democratic systems provide citizens at least some ability to express frustration peacefully through open debate and elections even though that was not much evident in Greece's case since Greek citizens do not continue to accept the political system as legitimate when the economic performance of the country still suffers.

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***Trade unions under economic crisis: Has their influence weakened? The Greek example***

Trade unions have been battling on the side and for the employees and laborers throughout the years. History labor pages have been written all over the world through organised struggles for employee rights. Sometimes battles were won and in other cases were lost but common factor in both results was the mutual feeling of cooperation and the trust which were the intriguing factors that gave strength to labor struggles. Greek labor movement has been severely affected by the effects of the recent economic crisis. Labor laws have been cancelled or paused or altered towards the benefits of the employers according to the relevant MOU's signed from Greek governments and under the strict guides of the IMF and the EU, leaving the labor movement in state of 'clinical death' waiting for the 'doctors' to pull the plug. Therefore, the aim of this study is to investigate the role that Trade Unions had and their organised behavior and strategy, if any, towards this political attack in employees' rights in Greece whereas their active or passive position according to their leadership how it was perceived by their members.

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***The first joint stock companies: The emergence of democratic elements in business***

In the present essay we analyse the emergence of joint stock companies during the 16th and 17th centuries in business (the Dutch partnederij), the EIC and the VOC East India Companies, the corsair companies for "war for profit" and the pirate "companies of plunder". We suggest that in states with relative weak central authorities like England and the United Provinces (UP, or Dutch Republic) market solutions are found to solve organization problems, and these solutions, the first joint-stock companies are different, but also democratic in their structure. England and the UP show that democratic elements emerge in parallel in the economy (and sometimes precede) and in the political field, this being mutually reinforcing.

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***How financial MOUs for the support of South EU countries have affected EU Democratic Institutions.***

The recent recession started in 2007 has been the worst economic downturn since the time of big depression of 1929 initially started in USA and exported in Europe continent. In many European countries this led severe sovereign debt crisis beginning in 2010 and followed by implementation of austerity measures and significant impact on public, social and employment sector. Those tough austerity measures resulted structural reforms of welfare and labor market especially in South EU countries like Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Italy representing the most prominent examples. These policies were imposed to a large extend through the so called "Troika" which was an interaction between internal EU and external Organizations, like the European Union, the European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund respectively. Exerting influence enforced through International Market pressures to National Governments by those Organizations, which actually determine the freedom factor manipulating the national politics. Citizens realize that their National Economic institutions are no longer responsible for the decision making on major social and economic policies, on economic and welfare policies, on privatization and fire sale of public assets. Consequently citizens tend to question if this constrained democracy deserves further support. This is enhanced by the fact that National Parliaments are no longer develop policies but rather align with policies dictated by the above stated Institutions and enforced to accept such deals without asking the opinion of citizens. Nevertheless the EU intends to promote civil society participation in decision making and program policies applied. This contradiction needs to be analyzed in order to determine if there is a Democratic crisis in EU member states.

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***Europe, politique et culture pour une défense de l'exception culturelle***
Valéry appelait l' Europe Cap d' Asie ou Province- Europe. Où en est aujourd'hui cette Province? Une Europe qui a été l'Europe des monnaies- et aujourd'hui de la monnaie unique- n'est pas encore et toujours la continuation d'une Europe marginalisée, atomisée, helvétisée, encore et toujours à la merci d'une anarchie euro-organisatrice permanente?

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***Υπάρχουσες ανεξάρτητες αρχές ή ίδρυση ειδικής ανεξάρτητης αρχής για την καταπολέμηση της διαφθοράς;***

Παρότι οι ανεξάρτητες αρχές που έχουν ιδρυθεί εξυπηρετούν διαφορετικούς στόχους, θα μπορούσε να υποστηριχθεί ότι παράλληλα εξυπηρετούν και έναν κοινό στόχο, την καταπολέμηση της διαφθοράς. Ένα ερώτημα που προκύπτει εύλογα είναι το κατά πόσον ο στόχος αυτός μπορεί να επιτευχθεί όντως από τις υφιστάμενες ανεξάρτητες αρχές ή απαιτείται η ίδρυση μίας ειδικής ανεξάρτητης αρχής με αποκλειστικά αυτόν τον στόχο. Η παρούσα ανακοίνωση θα επιχειρήσει μία κριτική παρουσίαση της μέχρι τώρα συζήτησης και των απαντήσεων που έχουν δοθεί. Βέβαια η καταπολέμηση της διαφθοράς αποτελεί το κατεξοχήν αντικείμενο του Γενικού Επιθεωρητή Δημόσιας Διοίκησης, ο οποίος και παρουσιάζει στην ετήσια έκθεση των πεπραγμένων του τα ευρήματα και τις διαπιστώσεις του. Ως γνωστόν αντίστοιχες εκθέσεις πεπραγμένων για την ετήσια δραστηριότητά τους καταθέτουν όλες οι ανεξάρτητες αρχές. Σε ένα δεύτερο επίπεδο η προτεινόμενη ανακοίνωση θα διερευνήσει τα πεπραγμένα τους σε σχέση με την καταπολέμηση της διαφθοράς. Στη συνέχεια θα γίνει προσπάθεια να απαντηθεί και ένα επιπλέον ερώτημα, το κατά πόσον επαρκούν τα εργαλεία δράσης των ανεξάρτητων αρχών με τα οποία τις έχει προικίσει ο νομοθέτης για την εκπλήρωση ενός τέτοιου στόχου. Τέλος, στην ανακοίνωση αυτή θα παρουσιασθούν ενδεικτικά αφενός κάποιες χαρακτηριστικές υποθέσεις που διερευνήθηκαν από τις ανεξάρτητες αρχές και αφετέρου νομοθετικές και οργανωτικές προτάσεις που υποβλήθηκαν για την καταπολέμηση της διαφθοράς.

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***Political Transaction Costs Lessons from Economic Theory***

Democracy is "that form of government in which the sovereign power resides in the people and is exercised either directly by them or by officers elected by them." (*Oxford English Dictionary*). There are at least two conditions to the viability of this political arrangement: first, there must be incentives to participate in the exercise of power; second, in a world of differentiated preferences, this exercise of power requires building coalitions, which involves political transaction costs. The concepts of 'incentives' and 'transaction costs' are at the core of recent developments in economic theory. In a sense; both concepts relate to the existence of market failures or, more generally, flaws in institutional arrangements. Incentives are needed to motivate participants to an institutional arrangement to make converging decisions, notwithstanding their diverging interests. Political transaction costs are at the core of a decision-making process that can rely neither on the unique voice that would prevail in dictatorship nor, symmetrically, on the unified voice that would come out of pure consensus. The resulting puzzles and anomalies that shape the interactions of agents or group of agents embedded in a 'democratic' environment are shared by economics and political sciences and define what for centuries has been called 'political economy. This paper investigates these issues. It is organized in three sections. Section 1 digs deeper in the two concepts, 'incentives' and 'transaction costs' with a view at their relevance for the analysis of the running of democracy. Section 2 discusses the difficulties and political transactions costs of building coalitions, with illustrations from reforms of retirement programs. Section 3 draws some lessons with an emphasis on the role of intermediate or 'meso'- institutions in making coalitions possible and stable.

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***Governance networks surplus - democratic and legitimacy deficit? The long road to a democratic networked European Union***

The paper offers a critical appraisal of the perspectives over European integration in terms of new governance and particularly networks. This specific case of regional integration has anyway raised intriguing issues, regarding the content and role of democracy, legitimacy or legitimization, accountability and representation. The road leading to a networked European entity or a networked democracy might still be long, although networked processes or functions have already entailed serious consequences, both practically and normatively. Consequently, democracy appears to be the inevitable –albeit complex– guide during the respective course. In this framework, it is imperative to distinguish between the recognition of the feasibility *per se* of a post-majoritarian or post-liberal democracy and the correspondence of the emerging European realities to the relevant criteria. Simply put, the current literature tends to emphasize the challenges that the EU poses for political theory or organization as well as for (representative) democracy. This needs not to be refuted, but it still needs to be analyzed dialectically with the fact that democracy itself (however complex or even ambiguous) sets challenges, not to be taken lightly, for the emergence of the euro-polity.

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***Cyberspace Governance and State Sovereignty: A difficult relationship***

In cyberspace no single forum or international organization is responsible for regulating its activities. Governance is spread throughout numerous regimes, standard-setting fora and technical organizations both at the regional and the global level. The multilateral approach views cyberspace in Hobbesian terms. Supporters of this approach understand cyberspace as a chaotic domain that reinforces insecurity and therefore stress the importance of national sovereignty in cyberspace. This approach calls for the creation of a UN-led body that will be responsible for Internet governance, but at the same time states will be able to set their own national policies. The multilateral model has traditionally been supported by Russia, China, India, Iran and Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, the multi-stakeholder governance model involves state and non-state actors that represent the business sector and civil society. The rationale is to engage actors like technical corporations, search engines, internet users and civil organizations in order to develop norms about the governance of Internet. The advocates of the multi-stakeholder governance model argue that cyberspace norms will be accepted by internet-users, only if they are part of designing them. This will enhance legitimacy and authority of institutions, organizations and companies in cyberspace. Supported by the US, UK, Canada, Australia and organizations like Google and ICANN, the multi-stakeholder model has been quite popular in the pre-Snowden era. In the aftermath of the Snowden disclosure the legitimacy and credibility of this approach has been considerably weakened. There are legitimate concerns raised over the past years: Which are the civil society agencies and private companies that will be involved in the governance of Internet? Who do they represent and who will guarantee, that they will not serve as puppets of big powers? The purpose of the paper is to highlight the differences between the multilateral approach and the multi-stakeholder approach and discuss the future of cyberspace governance.

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***Democracy and Inequality in Classical Greece***

The ancient Greek world saw the development of both citizen-centered government and an economy that with a high rate of growth, at least by premodern standards. Democracy was a strong variety of citizen government. In the well-documented case of Athens democracy is correlated with especially high economic performance. Democratic political equality at Athens limited the extent of material inequality among citizens, through progressive taxation and incentivizing voluntary contributions by the wealthy. By contrast, non-democratic political equality in Sparta failed to limit the emergence of increasingly extreme material inequality among citizens. That failure that ultimately undermined Sparta's once-impressive capacities as a state. A comparison of government institutions in Athens and Sparta elucidates the relationship of democracy to economic performance, to state capacity, and to the distribution of wealth and income across citizen populations.

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***Direct democracy today***

In my paper I try to answer five questions: What does direct democracy mean? Which is the way that the above mentioned could be possible today, under the circumstances of the late capitalism and post representative system? Can the “direct democratic procedures” exist without the direct democracy system? What is the relation between “autogestion” and direct democracy? Is the referendum an instrument or a form of direct democracy regime?

First of all, I argue that the modern representative system is not a democratic system but an oligarchic one. Democracy can only be conceived as a direct democracy. Following that, I discuss the previous questions, which constitute the condition for clearing the way that direct democracy can exist. The first topic is that democracy is not only a procedure to decide and do things, but a regime with institutions, laws and democratic individuals who belong to a democratic society.

In this context, I analyze that the “autogestion” of a business or a factory in that representative capitalist system is not direct democracy. The same applies to all other social “autogestional” events. I also argue that the referendum, though it is wishful, is not a direct democracy method, but an oligarchic one. Finally, I argue that for the realization of a democratic system a political project would be necessary from the social majority. This project must have as base and goal equality, freedom as well as direct participation of the people to take decisions, make laws and control the authorities.

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***Quantitative easing, gold standard and democratic regime: The case of the USA***

This paper aims to study the nexus of political regimes and social justice with central banking. The evolution of money value is examined under the balance of both the chartalistic and metallistic views. Moreover, democratic power is considered under the spectrum of its relation to the elasticity of credit. Central banks function as a policymaker, market agent and lender of last resort, are utilized to answer to a question of primary importance. This is whether authoritarianism has its basis on printing money and managing liquidity privileges. We also look into the connection of federalism and unfair income distribution, which we argue that they are related to the independence and credibility of monetary authorities. We analyse as a case study one the most representative cases, that of the United States.

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***Fiscal policy under government debt constraints: recent evidence from Greece***

This paper investigates the effects of anticipated and unanticipated fiscal policy shocks on major Greek macroeconomic variables over the period 2000:1-2014:4 within a structural VAR (SVAR) framework. A model that combines zero restrictions with sign restrictions is applied to identify a government spending and a government revenue shock while controlling for debt dynamics. More specifically, the output and unemployment responses to fiscal shocks under different scenarios of public debt burden are considered. Our findings indicate that a government spending shock has quite sizable effect on unemployment and output while a government revenue shock has no profound effect on output and causes a slight increase in unemployment. Additionally, it is of utmost importance to consider the government debt burden in the model.

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***Το γερμανικό μοντέλο της "Κοινωνικής Οικονομίας της Αγοράς"***

Η ιδέα πραγματοποίησης ενός Οικονομικού και συγχρόνως Κοινωνικού Συστήματος μέσα στα πλαίσια της "Ελεύθερης Οικονομίας της Αγοράς" (Soziale Marktwirtschaft) είναι γερμανική. Σαν θεωρητική ιδέα γεννήθηκε από Γερμανούς Οικονομολόγους πριν το δεύτερο παγκόσμιο πόλεμο και υλοποιήθηκε για πρώτη φορά στην Γερμανία από πολιτικούς και γνώστες του μοντέλου μετά τον πόλεμο. Στα πλαίσια του συστήματος επιδιώκεται ένας συνδυασμός συνταγματικά καθιερωμένων στόχων: όπως η ελευθερία των οικονομικών δραστηριοτήτων, η κοινωνική δικαιοσύνη, η κοινωνική ασφάλεια και πρόνοια. Οι κύριοι θεωρητικοί πατέρες της Ιδέας αυτής ήσαν οι οικονομολόγοι Walter Eucken, Wilhelm Röbke, Alfred Mueller-Armack καθώς και ο δημιουργός του μεταπολεμικού οικονομικού γερμανικού θαύματος Ludwig Erhard, ο οποίος χρημάτισε Υπουργός Εθνικής Οικονομίας στην περίοδο 1950–1963.

Την Ιδέα τους την θεώρησαν σαν ένα είδος τρίτου οικονομικοκοινωνικού δρόμου μεταξύ των συμπληγάδων πετρών του Καπιταλισμού (της Σκύλλας) και του Κομμουνισμού (της Χάρυβδης). Η επιδίωξή τους ήταν από το ένα μέρος μία τελική νίκη κατά του αχαλίνωτου Καπιταλισμού του 19ου και 20ου αιώνα που γέννησε τον Χίτλερ και από το άλλο μία νίκη κατά της δικτατορικά οργανωμένης και απάνθρωπης κεντρικά Διευθυνόμενης Οικονομίας του Στάλιν. Με την ιδέα ενός φιλελεύθερου Οικονομικού Συστήματος με κοινωνικό πρόσωπο (χαρακτήρα), ήθελαν να συνθέσουν, επάνω στις βάσεις ενός Φιλελεύθερου και δημοκρατικού Πολιτικού Καθεστώτος, το οποίο προϋποθέτει ένα ισχυρό Κράτος Δικαίου, που θα είναι σε θέση να εγγυάται την οικονομική ελευθερία και να τη συνδέει όμως με τα ιδανικά μίας κοινωνικής δικαιοσύνης που θα εκφράζεται με την κοινωνική ασφάλεια και την κοινωνική πρόνοια. Έτσι χρησιμοποιήθηκαν συνειδητά οι όροι «Οικονομικό» και «Κοινωνικό» Σύστημα.

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***Democratic Institutions and Economic Performance: An Empirical Exploration***

The objective of this paper is to explore the relationship between democratic institutions and economic performance. It must be emphasized that political factors, although considered by theory as crucial towards the advancement of the overall development of countries, are mostly underestimated in empirical work. One of the most important reasons for this is that the political dimension of development cannot be easily defined and measured in contrast to its economic dimension. The economic aspect of development is expressed in quantitative terms with widely accepted indexes, such as real income per capita. In contrast to the economic aspect, there is no wide agreement on the measurement of the political dimension of development, which can only be quantified with the use of proxy variables in the relevant empirical literature. Therefore, development is not a one dimensional process.

As far as the empirical method is concerned, it must be stressed that panel data analysis is employed, which refers to repeated observations of enough cross-sections. This methodology permits to explore the dynamics of change. Moreover, the combination of time series with cross-sections can enhance the quality and quantity of data in a way that would not be attainable if using only one of these two dimensions. The empirical results suggest that an integrated policy framework should be adopted due to the complex nature of development. Accordingly, economic development is a challenging task as it is associated not only with the increase of income but also with a wide variety of noneconomic factors of political and social nature. Consequently, maintaining economic development, not only for the case of developing countries but developed as well, may be achieved only through the adoption and effective implementation of the appropriate long-run policies. More specifically, in order these strategies to be sustainable in the long run they should be associated with democratic transformation, high standards of legitimacy and accountability, increased freedoms, respected political rights and civil liberties, among other attributes of effective governance systems.

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***Energy Wealth as Peace and Democracy Incentive: The Eastern Mediterranean Case***

In the 21st century no international economic issue has been more illustrative of the benefits and liabilities of globalisation than energy and no economic issue has been more politicised. Indeed, energy resources of all kinds are known to be a double-edged sword. They can lead to long-term cooperation, as was the case with the European Coal and Steel Community in the 1950s, or ignite long lasting and non-conciliating disputes and violence, as has been the case in Africa. There is, however, no precedent to date where energy trade acted as an incentive for peace between states in high-scale conflict. Recent offshore energy discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean could offer Israel and Cyprus a comparatively clean, if managed and exploited wisely, low cost, indigenous source of energy providing for their needs and potentially enabling significant exports. However, they cannot for many reasons contribute to the overcoming of the region's long-standing political conflicts.

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***Fiscal Council and Evaluating Election Programs: The Case of Greece***

The crisis of the Greek economy underlined the structural deficiency of the domestic growth model that was depicted to the wide "twin-deficit" problem of a statist market economy. In the core of the Greek growth model is the role of the public sector which, inter alia, was characterized by high and permanent fiscal deficits, low efficiency and steady divergence from an advanced welfare state. During the 2010-2015 adjustment effort, fiscal adjustment was the critical dimension of the effort in order to stabilize public finances at a sustainable level and significantly reduce the financial needs. The sustainability, however, of public finance stabilization is determined by the structural reforms in the fiscal policy framework and the public financial administration framework. One of the structural fiscal reforms was the new law for the establishment of the Hellenic Fiscal Council in 2014 following the European institutional framework. However, a year after the legislation has been voted the Fiscal Council is still inactive. The significant delay, along with the political developments in 2015, feed the discussion concerning the tasks of the fiscal council and, particularly, the debate about the task of evaluating political parties' economic programs and promises, particularly, before elections. This is imperative in the case of Greece where the electoral cycle is strongly connected with fiscal deterioration. In this working paper we discuss the scenario of a fiscal council in Greece that could evaluate the election platforms, underlying, on the one hand, the theoretical points in terms of fiscal stability and democracy and, on the other hand, the critical preconditions and prerequisites so as this scenario to become a real structural reform.

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***Political economy perspectives of the fall of the Greek monarchy***

The paper uses a political economy perspective to explore the abolition of monarchy in modern Greece. First it reviews political economy literature on monarchy and autocracy, the rationale for hereditary succession in office and possible gains from constitutional monarchy based on division of labour. Next it presents the oscillating fortunes of the Greek monarchy in the period 1832 – 1974 and compares them with those of the rest of European monarchies. Noting that none of the standard explanations of the overthrow of the monarchy, war defeat, dissolution of the state, decolonization and revolution, applies to modern Greece, it embarks on an examination of proximate and ultimate causes of the fall of monarchy. In this connection, it analyses the legitimacy of the Greek monarchy, the erosion of its institutional credibility as a result of failures of the crown to abide by the constitutional rules it had promised to respect, and its rejection by the voters in the 1974 referendum that cut across the standard division of Right and Left and was overseen by a conservative incumbent.

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***Democracy compromise. An interpretation of the Greek impasse by questioning the cleavage between citizens' society and individuals' society***

The key objective of this study is to clarify the dotting between democracy and representation in the modern state as well as its endpoints, in the light of the formation and implementation of policy. Starting from George Contogeorgis' assumption, that the modern political system is neither democratic nor representative, we try to examine the internal sociopolitical structure of Modern Greek State, questioning the absence of a coordinate political proposal from its executive branch in order to deal with major socio-political and economic problems. In this context, the core questions under consideration are the following:

How is Democracy defined in the modern era? What is the relationship between democracy and civil society-citizens? How can we explain-interpret the distancing of the political function from the / its society?

The compromise and the mutation of the democracy concept from the Modernity, is attributed to its unfamiliar context and to the impossibility of understanding "of the theoretical challenge of Hellenic Republic". Also the project of its introduction into the European post-feudalism socio-political system, took place without the pre-suppositional conditions for its existence and operation. This process will lead to the weakening of its content and the dislocation of his variable qualifiers, through the discrimination/partitions and ideological/assessment determinations that condense in the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" democracy.

Hence, the inquiry of the operation of political function by the social policy body, localized, not on specific aspects of the political system, but in his self-constitutional setup, as pre-representative. As a result of the pre-representative relation between society and executive branch, a democratic deficit exists and thus a "legitimacy crisis" arises for the executive branch, caused by its inability to meet the basic requirements of each society.

What is happening right now in European countries and Greece in particular, is the creation of an "unbridgeable chasm" between the rulers and the ruled and an unconvincing claim by the political elites representing public interest. In the case of Greece, "the financial crisis, the numerous political scandals and the solutions proposed by the ruling party – in line with the IMF-EU recommendations – have led many people to believe that the social contract is up for renegotiation".

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***The role of the judicial officer in the survival of democracy***

Στην δημοκρατία η εξισορρόπηση των διάφορων κρατικών και μη εξουσιών με τα μέσα οικονομίας αποτελεί τον κύριο πυλώνα του πολιτεύματος.

Η δικαιοσύνη είναι η λειτουργία εκείνη του δημοκρατικού κράτους που καλείται να ασκήσει τον έλεγχο της δίκαιης ισορροπίας στο τρίγωνο κράτος – νόμος - πολίτης (και όχι μόνον) ενώ παράλληλα οφείλει συνεχώς να αυτοελέγχεται διότι το σύστημα δεν διαθέτει άλλον ελεγκτικό μηχανισμό για την ίδια. Το νομοθετικό οπλοστάσιο για την υπεράσπιση της λειτουργικής και προσωπικής ανεξαρτησίας του δικαστή στην Ελλάδα είναι υπερπλήρες και μάλιστα εντυπωσιακά αρτιότερο εκείνου άλλων πολύ περισσότερο προηγμένων στην δημοκρατία χωρών όπως η Γαλλία. Αρκεί όμως αυτό; Ασφαλώς όχι, διότι δεν πρόκειται για κεκτημένο, αφού ακόμα συζητάμε για την κατοχύρωση της ανεξαρτησίας της δικαιοσύνης, επινοώντας νέους τρόπους αυτοδιοίκησης. Ζούμε μέρες αμφισβήτησης της αξίας του πολιτεύματος μας. Η αμφισβήτηση της αξίας της δημοκρατίας που φάνηκε στα ποσοστά της αποχής των τελευταίων εκλογικών αναμετρήσεων δεν αφορά μόνον το πολιτικό σύστημα – αφορά και την ίδια την δικαιοσύνη – θεμέλιο λίθο του συστήματος αυτού. Ποια ασθένεια προσέβαλε την δημοκρατία μας; Η ίδια που φθείρει όλα τα πολιτεύματα: Η κατάχρηση της εξουσίας και των οικονομικών πόρων και μέσων. Ειδικότερα στις σημερινές δημοκρατίες η κατάχρηση αυτή, που έχει προσλάβει διαστάσεις διεθνούς ενδημίας, ακούει στο όνομα ΄΄διαφθορά΄΄. Η δικαιοσύνη έχει επιφορτισθεί με όλο το βάρος της ευθύνης που της φόρτωσε η κοινωνία για την καταστολή της διαφθοράς

Η καταστολή όμως δεν είναι ούτε το πρώτιστο ούτε το πλέον αποτελεσματικό μέσον για την καταπολέμηση οποιουδήποτε προβλήματος – η πρόληψη θα έπρεπε να μας έχει απασχολήσει προ πολλού. Καταστολή κανονικά είναι η αντιμετώπιση μιας περιορισμένης έκτασης παθολογίας και όχι μιας ενδημίας. Αλλά τα μεγέθη σε συνθήκες ενδημίας δεν είναι πλέον αντιμετωπίσιμα. Είμαστε μια κοινωνία που έχει χάσει τον βηματισμό της, στερημένη από κάθε φιλοσοφική διάθεση, πορεύεται με μόνο γνώμονα τον πλουτισμό και αναπόφευκτα παράγει νεολαία με υπαρξιακή σύγχυση, αδιαφορία για τα κοινά, απογοήτευση και αδράνεια. Από αυτήν την δεξαμενή των νέων θα αντλήσουμε τον μελλοντικό εκπαιδευτικό, τον γιατρό, τον δικαστή τον αστυνομικό τον δημόσιο υπάλληλο. Επιτρέπεται όμως αυτοί οι νέοι άνθρωποι, που θα πάρουν στα χέρια τους τις τύχες των συνανθρώπων τους να έχουν υπαρξιακή σύγχυση; Η ευθύνη είναι προφανής. Συνεπώς είναι απόλυτη ανάγκη έστω και τώρα να μιλήσουμε ανοικτά για την διαφθορά αντί να την κρύβουμε σαν φίδι στον κόρφο μας. Η διεθνής κοινότητα έχει συνείδηση της έκτασης και της σοβαρότητας του φαινομένου και ήδη κινείται έντονα προς την κατεύθυνση της δημόσιας έκθεσης του προβλήματος. Καθώς και της ευαισθητοποίησης κοινού και δημόσιων λειτουργών. Η σχολή δικαστών της Γαλλίας οργανώνει ετήσια σεμινάρια για την αντιμετώπιση της διαφθοράς τα οποία δεν έχουν πλέον νομικό η άλλο τεχνικό περιεχόμενο αλλά στοχεύουν στην κατανόηση της κοινωνικής καταστροφικότητας του φαινομένου. Είναι επείγουσα ανάγκη να ανοίξει δημόσια η συζήτηση για τη μάστιγα της διαφθοράς στους χώρους εργασίας σε όλα τα εκπαιδευτικά ιδρύματα, από το δημοτικό σχολείο μέχρι τις σχόλες των ενόπλων δυνάμεων, δημόσιας διοίκησης και δικαστών.

Πρέπει τα παιδιά να μάθουν πως η διαφθορά διαβρώνει την οικιακή και δημόσια οικονομία. Πρέπει να μάθουν με παραδείγματα πως το τίμημα της διαφθοράς αργά η γρήγορα θα πληρωθεί πολύ ακριβά. Η εκπαίδευση μας περιορίζεται στην τεχνική προετοιμασία των νέων. Ωστόσο, δεν είναι εκείνη που θα δείξει στο νέο άνθρωπο την αξία του κοινωνικού του ρόλου και εκείνων των στοιχείων του επαγγέλματος που θα τονώσουν την αυτοεκτίμηση του και θα τον κάνουν ανθεκτικό στις προκλήσεις - πιέσεις – απειλές. Μπορεί αυτό να ακούγεται πολύ ιδεαλιστικό αλλά είναι ο μόνος δρόμος που έχει απομείνει. Η κοινωνία μας πρέπει να αντιμετωπίσει τη διαφθορά και τον ευτελισμό που αυτή συνεπάγεται για τον δράστη που

είναι συγχρόνως και θύμα, με την εκπαίδευση. Αρκετά αφήσαμε το ρόλο αυτό στην ιδιωτική πρωτοβουλία της ενημέρωσης, που εδώ και 50 χρόνια προβάλλει σαν μόνες άξιες εκείνες του πλούτου, της γρήγορης και εύκολης κοινωνικής ανέλιξης και της αυτοπροβολής.

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***Economic efficiency and democratic institutions in Classical Political Economy***

Classical Political Economists stand very high in the long list of the liberal tradition and their positions were particularly elaborated concerning the issue of the democratic organisation of Society. This communication reviews the way that democratic values in general are perceived to affect the behavior of economic agents in the work of Adam Smith, Nassau William Senior and John Stuart Mill. Classical economists held that economic actions are context-dependent and thus constantly under the influence of social norms and values. In that sense, Democratic Governance not only guarantees the individual rights and the wellbeing of the people but also the more efficient use of economic resources through the balance of opposing sectional interests.

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